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## DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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23 March 1984

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Mr. William J. Casey Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20305

Dear Mr. Casey:

	The	following	items	οf	intelligence	are	provided	for	your	use	this	week:	25 <b>X</b> 1
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The West German Ministry of Defense has issued a revised description of the Navy, detailing a new maritime strategy which expands its role in southern Norwegian Sea operations. This is a formal acknowledgement by the naval staff of the importance of NATO's northern flank and the need to comit more forces to defend it. Implementation of the new strategy will entail purchase and construction of a new class of submarines to be employed in carrier operations in the gaps of the southern Norwegian Sea as well in offensive patrols forward of the barriers. Such operations would purportedly contribute to the security of sea lines of communications farther south. Thus far, the Navy has restricted its mission and capabilities to that of a coastal defense force. The revised strategy thus substantiates and highlights the Navy's continuing efforts to achieve at least a minimal "blue-water' capability as well as to improve its force level. Successful implementation of the new strategy, however, remains dependent on the resolution of two critical issues. The first is the need for tripartite agreement by the major NATO commanders to incorporate German naval forces into operations on the Alliance's northern flank and adjacent waters. Second, the Navy will have to obtain higher appropriations from an already strained defense budget. It has failed to resolve similar issues in the past, and chances for future success are dim. Thus, unless the Navy is willing and able to stretch its limited forces to assume its revised role--no doubt at the expense of existing missions--the proposed new tasks may ultimately constitute little more than a paper strategy.

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DIA review completed.

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_	The Soviets have initiated early spring offensives in Afghanistan in the north, east, and west.
	This heavy unit activity is characteristic of the
	high operational profile maintained throughout the winter. It is eviden
	that regimental or larger size operations either are or shortly will be underway. The FITTERS are quite likely to support operations in the
	eastern region of Nangarhar, as will the Jalalabad based helicopters.
	Soviet Union-based helicopters will very likely support the operations in the north along the Kunduz helicopter units. As is normal, Afghan
	regime units will doubtlessly accompany Soviet units in these operations
	The timing and extent of these operations reflect probable Soviet extent
	to gain and maintain the initiative in the ground war and to disrupt resistance preparations for their expected spring upsurge in operational
	activity.
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	JAMES A. WILLIAMS

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